There have been numerous discussions regarding both the advantages and disadvantages of becoming a member of the Customs Union for Turkey. While these discussions mostly focus on the changes in the volume of trade without much regard to the conjectural changes, empirical analysis of the issue has been insufficient. This study attempts to shed light on this issue by empirically investigating Turkey's international trade before and after the Customs Union Agreement. In doing so, we explicitly account for the concurrent changes in the macroeconomic environment that may have affected Turkey's trade with the rest of the world. Our empirical findings indicate that customs union agreement has positively impacted on Turkey's exports to and imports from the EU.
1.

Introduction
The relationship between Turkey and initially with the European Economic Cooperation (EEC) and later with the European Union (EU) has started with the association agreement signed in Ankara, in September 1963. An additional protocol, signed in November 1970 and put into effect in January 1973, specified the time schedule for the steps Turkey will take in the next 22 years to join the Customs Union (see, Berument et al., 2001) . In December 1995, the European Parliament took the decision to finalize the Customs Agreement with Turkey, while the final stage of Customs Union was arrived in January 1996. Turkey's joining the Customs Union has been considered as a step towards full membership to the EU, which is envisioned to not only increase the level of wealth in Turkey but also reduce the risk premium and encourage the volume of capital inflows.
Customs union theory has been defined as a branch of the tariff theory that deals with the effects of geographically discrimination (see, for example, Lipsey, 1960, and Chacholiades, 1978) . Suggested by this definition, customs union involves preferential trading agreements that imply zero duty among members on imports of goods and services and a common external tariff.
Turkey started to implement trade liberalization policies in the 1980s, after an extended period of an inward-looking development strategy. During the 1980s, like many other countries, Turkish economy also underwent series of trade reforms and abandoned the fixed exchange rate regime.
1 With the Customs Union agreement, Turkey's tariffs and levies on imports of manufactured products from the European Union were eliminated. Trade in agricultural products, with the exception of agroindustrial products, however, was excluded from this. According to the agreement, Turkey would also apply EU's common external tariff on imports from the third parties. Harrison et al. (1996) , suggest that improved access to third country markets would be the biggest gain from the customs union arrangement. Using a comparative static computable general equilibrium model for Turkey, they estimate that Turkey stands to gain between 1 and 1.5 per cent of GDP annually from customs union. By contrast, Mercenier and Yeldan (1997) , in a general equilibrium exercise, characterize the net impact of the customs union agreement as undesirable for Turkey. Also in a general equilibrium framework, Bekmez (2002) suggest that customs union would lead to revenue losses for the government sector and in GDP, though it would benefit the private sector.
While the foregoing works are based on projections under various economic scenarios, this paper takes the factual evidence since the implementation of the customs union as the basis of the analysis of its impact on Turkish trade. We model imports and exports for the Turkish economy as suggested in the literature, but with the addition that we investigate their differences, with regards to both the volume and behavioural aspects, separately for the EU group of countries as well as for the customs union period. For imports, we observe just the opposite: real appreciation of TL has had a positive impact on imports especially from the EU countries, though not in the CU period. In addition, we observe that political instability and good governance have been factors that contribute to trade.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we provide a closer look at the data and methodology. Section 3 presents the empirical results and finally Section 4 concludes.
Data and Methodology
Our data set is an unbalanced panel that comprises more than 150 countries and more than 2000 country-year observations that range over the years 1980 to 2001.
The data set mainly includes Turkey's imports from and exports to other countries, real bilateral exchange rates (RER) 2 and GDP levels in Dollars (source: World Bank).
In addition, we form a dummy for the customs union period (CU) that takes the value of 1 for 1996 till 2001 and another dummy for the 15 EU countries: DEU. (Baysan and Blitzer, 1991) .
from both the EU and non-EU country groups since the 1980s. In addition, the column (X/M)*100 shows the ratio of imports that can be financed through export
revenues. The table clearly shows that Turkey's exports to and imports from both EU and non-EU countries have increased steadily since 1980, conforming with the global trends towards growing economic integration. Moreover, as of 2001, there are no major differences in terms of the volume of Turkey's trade with the EU as opposed to that with the rest of the world. The financing ratio for imports also does not appear to diverge much between the EU trade and the non-EU trade. The export and import data in percentages of GDP also show a steadily growing trend over time for both groups of countries, while Turkey's trade imbalances with both groups also grow wider in the 1990s as compared to the 1980s. Goldstein and Khan (1976) and Murray and Ginman (1976) use the ratio of import prices to domestic prices to estimate the import demand function; likewise, Bond (1987) and Brada et al. (1997) use the ratio of export prices to world prices to estimate the export function. 4 An increase in rer indicates real appreciation of the TL. Table 3 indicate that Turkey's exports and imports behave according to predictions of the theory; both exports and imports are sensitive to income and price changes. In the estimation of the export equation using fixed effects model (equation Table 3 ), the income elasticity and elasticity of exports with respect to real exchange rates, which is taken a measure of relative price changes, are both statistically significant at 1 % significance level. The positive income elasticity is above 2.00 and negative price elasticity (real exchange rate appreciates if lnrer increases) is approximately -0.66. Overall, this shows that Turkish bilateral exports are income elastic but price inelastic. Similar results are obtained in the estimation of the import function using random effects model (equation 2.1 reported in Table 3 ).
reported in
The domestic income elasticity is above unity and relative price elasticity is less than one, both of which are significant at 1 % level.
Custom union agreement had significant impact on the Turkish exports and import values. In both export and import estimations, the variable deucu represents the dummy variable for the EU countries for the period when Custom Union is in effect. The coefficients of this variable in both export and the import equation are positive and statistically significant at 1% as can be seen in equations 1.2 and 2.2 in Table 3 , indicating that both exports to and imports from the EU countries increased following the agreement. These results demonstrate that custom union agreement and the resulting change in the tariff structure caused a significant change in the direction of trade towards EU and away from the Non-EU countries. To test this possible change in the behavior, income and price elasticities before and after the Custom Union needs to be examined.
However, the responsiveness of trade to income and price changes might have already differed between the EU and non-EU group of countries. To disintangle this, the first step is to consider the estimate of income and price elasticities of Turkish trade with the EU countries. The income and price variables are used interactively with the EU dummy in regressions 1.3 and 2.3, to measure the difference in elasticities for the EU countries. The statistically significant coefficients, estimated for these interactive variables demonstrate that the responsiveness of Turkish exports to and from the EU countries is different than the rest of the countries. The income elasticity of demand for the Turkish exports from the EU countries is smaller as compared to the income elasticity of demand from other countries (the difference in elasticity is estimated to be -0.96). In the import demand equation there is also an EU differential in the domestic income elasticity for imported goods (the difference in the elasticity is -0.36 according to these estimations). Price elasticities for exports and imports also differ for the EU countries. The differences in these elasticities are estimated to be 1.17 for exports and 0.44 for imports. Even though this makes the Turkish imports from EU more price elastic, it reverses the responsiveness of Turkish exports to the real exchange changes and causes some doubts about the responsiveness of the Turkish exports to the EU countries.
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Did the Custom Union agreement result in a change in the behavior of the EU demand for Turkish exports and Turkish demand for EU imports? The estimation results indicate that the responsiveness of the exports to the change in income in EU countries decreased. The statistically significant coefficient of the interactive term amongst the EU and Custom Union dummies and income variable shows that there is a -0.09 change in income elasticity following the Custom Union agreement. There is no significant change in the income elasticity of Turkish imports to domestic income level. However, we see that the price elasticity of both exports from and imports to 7 In fact, in a regression analysis that only includes the interactive EU dummy with the income and price variables, the export price elasticity is estimated to be -0.96 and the EU differential for the price elasticity is estimated to be 0.96, with statistically significant coefficients at 1 % level. Both coefficients combined indicate that Turkish exports to EU are not price sensitive.
EU changed after the Custom Union agreement. While exports became more price elastic (the combined effect adds up to an elasticity value of -1.01), import elasticity with respect to price changes declined considerably (the combined effect gives an elasticity value of -0.16).
It is possible to conclude that there was a significant effect of the Custom Union on Turkish trade; both the exports to EU countries and the imports from the EU countries increased following this new trade. Furthermore, the elasticities, which underline the behavioral patterns, have changed after the Custom Union. Even before the Custom Union, EU countries were Turkey's main trading partners but the trade union expanded the significant role of the EU countries in Turkish trade. In estimations conducted using OLS methodology (not reported here due to the inefficiency caused by the common coefficient), it is possible to include the EU and 
Conclusions
Turkey's trade share with the European Union countries has been about 50% of its overall trade volume since the 1980s . Empirical evidence in this paper shows that controlling for the effects of variables that are standard for the estimation of export and import demand functions, namely the real exchange rate and income levels, Customs Union period has augmented Turkeys trade volume. Our estimations reveal that, as predicted by the theory, while the value of currency (measured by the real exchange rate) is negatively related with exports and positively related with imports, Turkish GDP is positively related with imports and GDP of trading partners are also positively related with Turkey's exports at statistically significant levels.
Interestingly, however, we observe that the income elasticity of both exports and imports are lower for the EU countries, and especially in the CU period. The effect of the RER on Turkey's exports is stronger for the CU period, though not earlier. For imports, we observe just the reverse: real appreciation of TL has had a positive impact on imports especially for the EU countries, though not in the CU period. The amplified effect on imports of the rer for the EU country group probably captures the increased imports during the periods of largely overvalued TL, especially in 1993 and 2000. In addition, we observe that countries with higher political instability and better governance have had more trade with Turkey than others.
We conclude that customs union agreement has contributed to the increasing volume of trade between Turkey and the EU. In addition, income effect on trade has decreased over the CU period. However, our exports to the EU have become more responsive to the real exchange rate misalignments during the CU period, though not imports. This implies that periods of overvalued TL have come to carry a greater destabilizing risk for Turkish trade with the EU for it leads to a larger fall in exports than before.
